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In theoretical literature, smuggling is considered as a factor contributing to the deviation 
of the PPP-based exchange rates from the equilibrium exchange rates with little empirical 
support. In this paper, we used panel data for 33 developing countries over the period 
1982-1995 and used panel unit root and panel cointegration technique along with pooled 
OLS, fixed effects, random effects, and Parks estimator in an augmented Balassa-Samuelson 
framework. Using two different proxies for smuggling it is found that smuggling into a 
country leads to an appreciation of domestic currency that can be considered as another 
cause of loosing competitiveness by many developing countries. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The absolute version of the purchasing power parity (henceforth, PPP) asserts that once 
we convert into common currency, national price levels should be equal (Rogoff (1996)). 
For example, if we denote the price level of  i th commodity at home by  i P  and the price 
of the same commodity abroad by 
*
i P   according to the law of one price, 
*
i i EP P =  where 
E   is the nominal exchange rate defined as number of domestic currency per unit of foreign 
currency. This relation holds in the absence of any form of imperfections across the borders. 
This is equivalent to saying that 
* / i i P P E =  or  1 /
* = i i EP P   for the PPP to hold. From this 
premise, a large body of literature has tried to explain theoretically and or empirically if the 
PPP holds. As a matter of fact, it has become a common practice among the empirical 
researchers to test the invalidity of the PPP and to identify factors that contribute to its 
failure.  
The main body of literature that explains the reasons for deviation of the PPP from 
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the equilibrium exchange rate comes under the heading of “productivity bias hypothesis” 
followed by the seminal works of Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). The hypothesis 
basically claims that the gap between the PPP and the equilibrium exchange rate is wider 
when productivity differentials are larger between two countries. Alternatively, a more 
productive country should experience a real appreciation in her currency. Many 
researchers tested this hypothesis in a cross sectional, time series or panel framework.   
In addition to the productivity differentials as a determinant of the real exchange rate 
or as a factor contributing to the deviation of the PPP from the equilibrium exchange rate, 
more recent studies have identified other factors. They are: factor endowment 
differentials (Bhagwati (1984), Kravis and Lipsey (1983)); market structure (Cheung et 
al. (1999)) income level (Heston et al. (1994)); share of minerals in GDP as a measure 
of natural resource abundance (Clague (1986), Bahmani-Oskooee and Nasir (2001)); 
black market premium as a measure of capital control (Edwards (1988), Bahmani- 
Oskooee and Nasir (2001)); tariff (Edwards (1988)); corruption (Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Nasir (2002)); government spending (De Gregorio et al. (1994), Alquist and Chinn 
(2002)); military spending (Bergstrand (1991, 1992)); differences in the degree of factor 
mobility (Clague (1985)); supply shock especially the real oil price shock (DeLoach 
(2001), Alquist and Chinn (2002)); real interest rate differential (Ronald and Jun 
(1999)); trade restrictions, speculation in the foreign exchange market, higher 
expectation of inflation, real changes in the economy, long term capital movements and 
government intervention (Officer (1976, p. 9)); terms of trade (Edison and Klovland 
(1987)); and the level of education (Isenmen (1980)). 
In this paper, we would like to extend the literature by arguing that smuggling 
between two countries could be another factor contributing to the deviation of the PPP 
or another determinant of the real exchange rate. To this end, in Section 2 we provide our 
theoretical arguments pertaining to the relation between smuggling and the real exchange 
rate and introduce a simple model to be tested. Section 3 provides the empirical results and 
implication and Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2.    THEORY AND THE MODEL 
 
In an effort to cope with the external balance of a country, especially in developing 
world, policy makers adhere to trade restrictions by raising their tariff rates or by 
imposing quotas. Such policies usually result in shortage of restricted commodities and 
thus, in higher prices. It is the higher prices that create opportunities for some people to 
engage in the act of smuggling. Once smuggled goods enter into a country, they are sold 
at on-going high prices, causing the relative prices to deviate from the equilibrium 
exchange rate. Indeed, Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) provide a theoretical exposition of 
smuggling and contend that high tariff acts as a trade-diverting factor that contributes to 
smuggling. Sheikh (1974) introduces risk factor associated with smuggling and argues 
that it is mostly due to risk associated with smuggling that smugglers charge higher SMUGGLING AS ANOTHER CAUSE OF FAILURE OF THE PPP   
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prices. Martin and Panagariya (1984) in a crime-theoretic approach explicitly modeled 
the expected costs of smuggling along with the expected benefits. They introduced 
enforcement as a factor that lowers illegal imports and at the same time raises the real 
cost of smuggled goods. The work by Cooper (1974), Norton (1986), Thursby et al. 
(1991), Lovely and Nelson (1995), Fautsi (2001) also fall into this category. According 
to this second approach, expected benefit is represented by tariff evasion and the 
expected cost is represented by the probability of being caught by customs authority and 
being punished by the law. The law and order or enforceability captures these factors.   
In order to assess the impact of smuggling on real exchange rate, we select a simple 
model from the literature, i.e., a model that is used by previous researchers to test Balassa’s 
(1964) productivity bias hypothesis and augment it with a measure of smuggling as another 
determinant of real exchange rate. Assuming the U.S. as the base country and the dollar as 
the reserve currency, let  it E   denote the number of country  i ’s currency per U.S. dollar at 
time  t . Furthermore, let  it P  be the price level in country  i  and 
t s u P . . , the price level in 
the U.S. Thus, the PPP-based exchange rate could be defined as  t s u it P P . .  and  its  deviation 
from the equilibrium exchange rate as  it t s u it E P P ) ( . .  or as  ) ( . . it t s u it E P P ⋅  which is the 
real exchange rate defined as number of dollar per country i’s currency. Thus, our proposed 
model in log linear form takes the following form:   
 
it it it it u + + + = SMUG PROD Log REX Log λ β α                            ( 1 )  
 
where  ) ( REX . . it t s u it it E P P ⋅ = ; it PROD  is a measure of productivity in country  i  relative 
to the U.S.;  it SMUG  is a measure of smuggling in country  i  and  it u  is an error term. 
Note that since SMUG variable can take zero value, it enters into the model at its level 
rather than Log form. Following the literature, if a more productive country is to experience 
a real appreciation in her currency, an estimate of  β  should be positive and if an increase 
in smuggling is to cause deviation of relative prices from nominal exchange rate, i.e., a real 
appreciation, we would also expect an estimate of  λ   to be positive. Equation (1) is subject 
to an empirical analysis in the next section to which we turn next. 
 
 
3.    EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND IMPLICATION 
 
We estimate Equation (1) by pooling cross-sectional annual data from 33 developing 
countries over the period 1982-95. There are only 33 developing countries for which 
consistent set of data over the period 1982-95 is available for all variables in equation 
(1) from the sources to be explained.
1 The real exchange rate and productivity data are 
 
1 The sample includes Argentina, Bostwana, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivorie, Dominican 
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from Penn World Table, Version 6 (Heston et al. (2001)).
2 We use two different 
measures of smuggling. The first measure is the average import tariff rate (denoted by 
TARIF in the Tables). The data are taken from World Development Indicator CD-ROM 
(The World Bank (2001)).
3 The second measure is a measure of smuggling that is 
denoted by SMUG in our model. It is constructed from two indices, namely the average 
tariff rate and a measure of enforceability (or law and order). The data for law and order 
index is assembled by IRIS Center at the University of Maryland from the hard copies of 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). It is argued that higher import tariff is 
associated with higher smuggling on one hand. On the other hand, the probability of 
being caught and punished by the law enforcing authorities depends to some extent, on 
the law and order situation of a country. Better law and order situation works as a 
limiting factor that makes smuggling less profitable. The smuggler wants to maximize 
the net gain out of smuggling that is the difference between the expected benefit of high 
tariff and the expected cost of being caught and punished. The expected cost is not 
realized but it can be argued that it depends on the observed law and order situation of a 
country. So it is sensible to construct an index of smuggling based on these two indices. 
The data on tariff rates are already in percent term and they range from 0 to 1. The data 
on law and order is in index form ranging from 0 to 6 where 0 indicates absence of law 
and order. To make this index consistent with tariff rate as well as with smuggling we 
need two transformations. First, we subtract it from 6 so that an increase in the index 
reflects less law and order. The transformed index is now positively associated with 
more smuggling (the same as an increase in tariff rate). Second, in order for the tariff 
rate and index of law and order to carry the same unit in constructing the SMUG 
variable, we divide the transformed variable of law and order by 6. This way, the 
measure of law and order ranges from 0 to 1 with 0 meaning the highest enforceability 
and 1 meaning the lowest enforceability. Taking simple average of tariff index and our 
transformed law and order index yields our measure of smuggling or the SMUG variable. 
The graphical plot of these two alternative proxies for smuggling gives us an idea about 
 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, The Philippines, Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.   
2 To download data on real exchange rate and productivity from PWT6, visit the website 
http://webhost.bridgew.edu/baten/index.htm. Note that real exchange rate is marked as p and productivity as 
rgdpw in PWT6. From rgdpw we generated productivity ratio by considering the USA as reference country. 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Nasir (2001, 2002) used this approach first. 
3 We borrow this concept from public finance literature. For example, Cebula (1997) showed that the 
relative size of the underground economy in the USA is an increasing function of federal personal income tax 
rate. In another study, Thursby and Thursby (2000) modeled the interstate cigarette smuggling in USA to be 
increasing function of tax rate differential and enforcement rules. They found that the increase in federal 
excise tax is associated with greater proportion of smuggled cigarettes. SMUGGLING AS ANOTHER CAUSE OF FAILURE OF THE PPP   
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the dynamics of smuggling in the developing countries (Appendix). Except Singapore, 
most of the countries have consistent pattern of high smuggling index that always stay 
above the tariff index, indicating that enforceability is a factor that plays important role 
in developing countries. 
Before estimating Equation (1) with the two alternative measures of smuggling, we 
must first verify the fact that such a long-run relationship among the variables exits. This 
amounts to applying recent developments in panel unit root testing and panel 
cointegration. To this end, we must establish that each variable in (1) is non-stationary, 
whereas, the residuals are stationary. We employ two unit root tests, i.e., Levin and Lin 
or LL test (1992) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) known as the IPS test. They are both 
ADF tests with the difference that LL allows for heterogeneity only in the constant term, 
whereas, IPS allows for heterogeneity in both constant and slope terms of the ADF test. 
For cointegration tests we apply the ADF test to the residuals of (1) following all 
adjustments suggested by Pedroni (1995, 1999). Here we employ Pedroni’s two statistics 
known as Panel-t and Group-t. Noting that any ADF statistic is nothing but a t-ratio, the 
Panel-t averages over the numerator and the denominator of the individual t-statistics 
separately, whereas, the Group-t averages the whole ratio of individual t-statistics. 
Necessary adjustments are made to all statistics so that they are all distributed as 
standard normal. For formulation and intuitive explanations of these tests see 




Table 1.    Panel Unit Root and Panel Cointegration Test Results 
Panel A: Unit Root Test Results 
Variable  LL ADF Stat  IPS ADF Stat 
LRER  0.17 -0.92 
LPROD  1.69 -0.29 
TARIFF  -1.46 -3.82 
SMUG  2.01 0.07 
Panel B: Cointegration Test Results 
Variables in Cointegrating Space  Panel-t Group-t 
LRER, LPROD, TARIFF  -2.25 -3.07 
LRER, LPROD, SMUG  -1.64 -3.57 
 
4  We use one lag because we have yearly data for only 14 years. For another application of panel 
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Panel A in Table 1 reports the panel unit root test results. As can be seen, the 
calculated LL statistic for all four variables is greater than its critical value of -1.96 at 
the usual 5% level of significance, indicating that all variables are non-stationary. IPS 
test also yields similar results except in the case of TARIF variable.
5 Assuming that all 
variables are stationary, we report the Panel-t and Group-t test results for cointegration 
in Panel B of the table. As can be seen, the three variables in both models are 
cointegrated using the Group-t test. This is due to the fact that the calculated statistic in 
both models is less than the critical value of -1.96 at the 5% level of significance. The 
Panel-t results yield similar outcome at the 5% level of significance for the first model 
and 10% level of significance for the second model.
6  
While cointegration results assure us that the long-run relationship exists among the 
variables of each model, they cannot reveal the direction in which the dependent 
variable changes in response to a change in any of the independent variables. 
Furthermore, cointegration among a set of variables could be due to strong relation 
among some of them but not all of them. To solve these problems, we must estimate the 
models using panel regression methods.   
We consider six different panel regression methods at this stage. In case 1, simple 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is applied to the pooled data. However, the OLS is too 
restrictive in the sense that some countries have individual characteristics that are 
different than other countries. For example, some countries may undertake capital 
control while others do not. Hence, we need to control for individual characteristics. 
This gives rise to case 2 that allows individual intercepts and also preserves the OLS 
characteristic of case 1. In this case, we take account of country specific factors by 
including 32 country dummies and apply the OLS technique again. In standard 
econometrics textbooks, this second model is called the “fixed-effects model” and it 
assumes that there are common slopes but different intercepts for each cross-sectional 
unit. The advantage of using this technique is that it provides consistent estimates of 
parameters even if individual characteristics are correlated with the error term. The third 
case is the straightforward extension of case 2 where in addition to 32 country dummies, 
we introduce 13 time dummies (one for each year under consideration and one dummy 
is reserved) and apply the same technique as case 2. This case captures the individual 
time effect as well as the country effect. In spite of their large-sample advantage, they 
have their limitations in the sense that LDCs may differ with respect to individual 
characteristics from each other while the reason for this difference may be unknown. To 
capture this kind of situation, we switched to case 4. This model is known as the 
 
5 Note that under the IPS test, it is possible that as little as one series from within the panel could be 
responsible for rejecting the null hypothesis of joint non-stationarity. 
6 Note that the fact that the real exchange rate is non-stationary, as reflected by the results in Panel A of 
Table 1, supports the failure of the PPP. For more on this and other approaches to test the PPP see Schweigert 
(2002) and Bahmani-Oskooee and Mirzaie (2000). SMUGGLING AS ANOTHER CAUSE OF FAILURE OF THE PPP   
 
29 
“random effect model” which is similar to case 2 with the difference that each 
cross-sectional intercept has its own distribution. Similarly, to capture the time effect in 
a random effect framework and keeping the distributional assumptions of errors intact, 
we introduce case 5. Case 4 and 5 are considered as the generalized least squares (GLS) 
with dummies in a panel framework. But the cost of using 4 and 5 are substantial in the 
sense that the individual effect is assumed to be uncorrelated with the error term, which 
is rarely possible. In cases 1-5, we assume well-behaved error terms in the sense that we 
do not allow for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation or contemporaneous correlation. To 
capture this, we introduce case 6 where we allow unexplained variation to change across 
countries (heteroskedasticity), errors are serially correlated of order 1 or AR (1) and one 
country’s action may affect another country (which is always the case in smuggling) or 
contemporaneous correlation. This is equivalent to applying the method introduced by 
Parks (1967). The results for all six cases using TARIFF as a measure of smuggling in 
the model are reported in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2.    Coefficient Estimates of Equation (1) when TARIFF is used   
as a Proxy for Smuggling 
  Coefficient Estimate of  Diagnostic Tests 
 
Constant Log  PROD TARIFF 
2 R  
Other Panel 
Specification Tests 
Case 1  4.30 (93.18)  0.48 (16.79) 0.01  (4.57)  0.38  LM =
2
(1) χ = 689.17 
P
2 χ > = 0.0000 
Case 2  3.79 (19.60)  0.36 (4.35) 0.02  (9.79)  0.73  F value = 16.76 
P value < .0001 
Case 3  3.63 (16.49)  0.26 (2.78) 0.02  (9.40)  0.74  F value = 12.37 
P value < .0001 
Case 4  4.10 (39.32)  0.46 (7.86) 0.02  (9.16)  0.23  m value = 12.17 
P value = .0023 
Case 5  4.09 (38.86)  0.45 (7.67) 0.02  (9.10)  0.22  m value = 12.82 
P value = .0016 
Case 6  4.17 (119.41)  0.55 (46.63) 0.02  (98.99)  0.99  na 
Notes: Figures inside the parentheses are the absolute values of t-ratios. F represents F statistic that is used to 
choose between the OLS and the fixed-effects model. P represents P values and m represents the Hausman 
specification test (referred as m) that is used for choosing between the fixed-effects and the random-effects 
model. The LM statistic is calculated directly from the OLS residual to compare the OLS with the GLS while 
the rejection of the null hypothesis favors the random-effects model. The LM statistic has a Chi square 
distribution with one degree of freedom. 
 
 MOHSEN BAHMANI-OSKOOEE AND GOUR G. GOSWAMI
   30 
It is clear from Table 2 that no matter which case we consider, the TARIFF variable 
carries its expected positive sign and highly significant coefficient in all cases. This 
supports our theoretical expectation that an increase in tariff results in deviation of the 
PPP from the equilibrium exchange rate or a real appreciation.
7  Although we have used 
the tariff rate as a proxy for smuggling, one could consider it as a measure of trade 
restriction. Restriction to trade is also said to be another cause of failure of the PPP. On 
this regard, Edwards (1988) included tariff rate as a determinant of real exchange rate. 
He provided a framework to show the real and monetary determinants of the real 
exchange rates in developing countries by using data from 12 developing countries over 
the period 1960-85 periods. Although, the tariff rate carried positive coefficient in 
Edward's model, it was insignificant. Thus, our finding of highly significant coefficient 
for tariff rate is an improvement as compared to Edwards. How will the results change if 
we replace the tariff rate with our index for smuggling, i.e., the SMUG variable? The 
results for all six cases are reported in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3.    Coefficient Estimates of Equation (1) when SMUG is used 
as a Proxy for Smuggling 
  Coefficient Estimate of  Diagnostic Tests 
 
Constant Log  PROD  SMUG  2 R  
Other Panel 
Specification Tests 
Case 1  4.35 (74.27)  0.44 (14.99) 0.00  (0.02)  0.35  LM =
2
(1) χ = 583.12 
P >
2 χ = 0.0000 
Case 2  3.75 (17.36)  0.33 (3.70) 1.08  (6.36)  0.69  F value = 14.79 
P value < .0001 
Case 3  3.70 (15.66)  0.29 (2.85) 1.24  (5.67)  0.70  F value = 10.82 
P value < .0001 
Case 4  4.04 (35.06)  0.43 (7.19) 0.89  (5.51)  0.15  m value = 13.10 
P value = .0014 
Case 5  4.04 (35.14)  0.43 (7.20) 0.89  (5.49)  0.15  m value = 8.94 
P value = .0114 
Case 6  4.06 (66.15)  0.50 (11.86) 1.05  (13.76)  0.60  na 
Notes: Figures inside the parentheses are the absolute values of t-ratios. F represents F statistic that is used to 
choose between the OLS and the fixed-effects model. P represents P values and m represents the Hausman 
specification test (referred as m) that is used for choosing between the fixed-effects and the random-effects 
model. The LM statistic is calculated directly from the OLS residual to compare the OLS with the GLS while 
the rejection of the null hypothesis favors the random-effects model. The LM statistic has a Chi square 
distribution with one degree of freedom. 
 
7 We also note that in all six cases, the coefficient attached to the productivity ratio is positive and 
significant, confirming Balassa’s (1964) productivity bias hypothesis. SMUGGLING AS ANOTHER CAUSE OF FAILURE OF THE PPP   
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It appears that except case 1, in the remaining five cases, the SMUG variable carries a 
highly significant and positive coefficient supporting our theoretical arguments that 
smuggling could cause the PPP to deviate from the equilibrium exchange rate. There is a 
widely held belief that smuggling is detrimental to the welfare of a nation in that it causes 
damage to the economy, especially to infant industries. Our finding that smuggling results in 
real appreciation, exacerbates the damage due to loss of international competitiveness. 
 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
The purchasing power parity theory (PPP) has dominated the literature for the last 
century. While one group of studies has tested the PPP, another group has tried to 
identify factors that cause the PPP-based exchange rate to deviate from the equilibrium 
rate. Such factors include productivity differentials, level of education, government 
intervention, trade restrictions, natural resource abundance, long-term capital movement, 
speculation, expected inflation and corruption. 
In this paper, we introduce yet another factor, i.e., smuggling as another source of 
deviation of the PPP from the equilibrium exchange rate. It is argued that any restriction 
to trade that leads to smuggling results in higher domestic prices, thus, to a real 
appreciation of domestic currency. Performing panel unit root and panel cointegration 
tests we find the presence of long run equilibrium relationships among variables. This 
led us to conduct rigorous panel regression analysis by pooling cross-sectional data from 
33 developing countries over 1982-95 periods. We estimated six different specifications 
and showed that indeed, smuggling (whether proxies by tariff rate or an index that is 
based on tariff and enforceability) results in real appreciation. Thus, any measure 
designed to reduce tariff or smuggling not only will result in a gain in international 
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